There is a large literature on the productivity of universities. Little is known, however, about how different types of leader affect a university's later performance. To address this, I blend quantitative and qualitative evidence. By constructing a new longitudinal dataset, I find that the research quality of a university improves some years after it appoints a president (vice chancellor) who is an accomplished scholar. To try to explain why scholar-leaders might improve the research performance of their institutions, I draw from interview data with twenty-six heads in universities in the United States and United Kingdom. The findings have policy implications for governments, universities, and a range of research and knowledge-intensive organizations.
Highly Cited Leaders and the Performance of Research Universities

Introduction
Although there is a large literature on the research productivity of universities 1 , little is known about how different types of leader affect a university's performance. The success of a leader may be due to many immeasurable factors.
Nevertheless, it is important that researchers try to establish the effectiveness of heads despite the cloudy conditions, because leaders usually have the most power in organizations, and substantial resources are invested in their recruitment and pay.
In this paper I attempt to fill the gap. Using new longitudinal data and interview evidence, I concentrate on a particular leader-characteristic --the level of scholarly expertise a university president or vice chancellor 2 possess. The core business of a university is research and teaching, but research quality is what separates top universities from their competitors. Institutions that produce the best research receive the largest share of public funding and private philanthropy. There is also a significant relationship between the quality of research and the extent of industry funding (Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005) . The focus in this paper is on scholarship. It seems important to know whether individuals who have obtained a high standard as a researcher bring something different to the leadership role. An alternative possibility is that the head of a research university primarily needs high managerial ability and that the level of scholarly ability is unimportant. Using 1 The literature on the determinants of university research performance and innovation includes Johnes, 1993, 1995; Von Tunzelmann et. al., 2003; Oppenheim and Stuart, 2004; Rigby and Edler, 2005; Adams and Clemmons, 2006; Crespi and Geuna, 2006; Katz, 2006; Zhang and Ehrenberg, 2006 and Charlton and Andras, 2007; Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso, 2007 . For the influence of human capital externalities on economic growth see Lucas, 1988 . For the economic effects of university or public research, see Adams, 1990 and Adams & Clemmons, 2008 , Anselin, Varga & Acs, 1997 , Basu, Fernald & Shapiro, 2001 , Basu, Fernald, Oulton & Srinivasan, 2003 , Cohen, Nelson & Walsh 2002 , Aghion et al., 2005 , Aghion, 2006 , Stuen, 2007 and Bramwell & Wolfe, 2008 . For a link between the location of top scientists and increases in the number of biotech firms, see Zucker et al., 1998 . On how the location of university graduates increases salaries for those less educated, see Moretti, 2004 . For a link with top scholars and size-of-research-team effect on scientific outputs and influence, see Adams, et al., 2005. 2 The term 'president' will more commonly be used in this paper to denote the executive leader of a university --to include vice chancellor, principal, rector, director, among others.
quantitative and qualitative data this paper attempts to address the question: does it matter to the performance of a university if the leader has been a top scholar? Four themes emerge from the interviews: First, scholars are seen as more credible leaders. A president who is a researcher will gain greater respect from academic colleagues and appear more legitimate. Legitimacy extends a leader's power and influence. Second, it is argued that being a top scholar provides a leader with a deep understanding or expert knowledge about the core business of universities.
This informs a head's decision-making and strategic priorities. Third, interviewees suggested that it is the president who sets the quality threshold in a university, and, therefore, that the bar is raised when an accomplished scholar is hired. Thus, a standard bearer has first set the standard that is to be enforced. Finally, a president who is a researcher sends a signal to the faculty that the leader shares their scholarly values, and that research success in the institution is important. It also transmits an external signal to potential academic hires, donors, alumni and students.
Research universities are part of the knowledge-intensive sector (Mintzberg, 1979) . More broadly, this paper suggests that in knowledge-based organizations, where the majority of employees are expert workers, having a leader who is also an expert may be beneficial to the institution's long-term performance. Put another way, my central argument is that in settings where expert knowledge is the key factor that characterizes an organization's core business, it is likely to be expert knowledge that should be key in the selection of its leader.
Universities are an interesting case because they are a significant source of innovation in society, and also their leaders' technical expertise can be measured reasonably objectively. There exist a number of influential empirical studies of leaders in higher education 4 . Yet there has been little statistical thinking about how university presidents and vice chancellors can influence performance. The paper's results seem of potentially wide interest to universities, policy-makers and our understanding of R&D processes.
Part One --Longitudinal Evidence
It has recently been shown that there is a positive correlation between the scholarly achievement of a university's president and the position of that university in a global league table. The higher a university is ranked in the 'Academic Ranking of World Universities' 5 , the higher the life-time citations of its leader (Goodall, 2006) .
This cross-section pattern has also been replicated for deans of business schools (Goodall, 2009) . Although correlations do not prove that more highly cited leaders are more effective, they do signal assortative matching. The most successful universities in the world arguably have the widest choice of leaders to select from, because they have deeper pockets and higher status. That they hire top researchers is notable. Knowing this is a necessary prerequisite if trying to explore whether scholarleaders actually make a positive difference to the research performance of universities. If no correlation were found --i.e. top universities did not select top scholars --then the main idea in this paper is certainly wrong. But can we go beyond a simple cross-sectional correlation?
It is hard to isolate the contributions of individual leaders on organizational performance. Institutional heads are not randomly assigned, and the quality of a university is established over many years incorporating factors such as an institution's history, reputation, age and wealth. One approach adopted by authors is to assess how an organization performs after the death of a leader, which creates an exogenous shock. Jones & Olken (2005) is strongly correlated with a later decline in firm profitability. This, again, seems to confirm that leaders matter to the performance of organizations. Bertrand & Schoar (2003) demonstrate that CEO fixed effects are correlated with firms' profitability.
Their study is important because it suggests that individuals themselves can shape outcomes 6 .
Focusing on the death of a leader was not feasible in this university setting because so few presidents and vice chancellors actually die in position. It may be possible instead to get an indication of a leader's effect through a longitudinal method that uses lags, an acceptable performance measure (i.e. not league tables) and control variables. In this paper it is suggested that:
Hypothesis: There is a positive relationship between the prior scholarly ability of a university president and the future success of that institution.
Methodology
The hypothesis is tested by using multiple regression analysis with the change in university performance as the dependent variable and the scholarly success of presidents as the key independent variable. The focus is on longitudinal improvements in university performance. Control variables for university income, presidential age and discipline are also used. These are incorporated to check the robustness of the correlations between university performance and a leader's research history.
Information from the UK is used because of the unique method of assessing research performance that has been available in that country for a number of years -6 Theoretical explorations of leadership are offered by Hermalin, 1998 Hermalin, , 2007 , who focuses on the incentives used by leaders to induce followers to follow; by Majumdar & Mukand, 2007 , who construct a model in which a key role is played by followers' willing to put their faith in the their leader; and by Dewan & Myatt, 2008 , who concentrate on the role played by a leader's ability, and willingness, to communicate clearly to followers. 
The Sample of Institutions
The 55 institutions selected make up the oldest and most established research universities in the UK (for a list of sample institutions, see Appendix A). They are often referred to as the 'old' universities, those that existed before 1992, a period that marked a major expansion in the number of UK higher education institutions. This group has consistently generated the majority of academic research and they continue to receive the bulk of UK research income 9 .
As suggested above, age, size, wealth and reputation are all contributing factors to the long-term success of any university. But it is important to mention that success over the last 40 years among UK research universities has not been confined to one particular group. There has been movement up and down in RAE performance and also in various league tables (see, for example, league tables in The Guardian newspaper, The Times and Times Higher Education).
The Leaders
The sample includes 157 British university presidents. They have led the 55 universities over, approximately, a twenty-year period. It is the presidents in place in 1992 and 1996 that appear most in the statistical analysis. Biographical information has come from 'Who's Who', the Association of Commonwealth Universities, and from individuals' biographies. 7 The Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) was designed to help inform UK funding bodies' decisions about how to distribute public money for research. 8 Hence I do not count patent citations in the sense of Oppenheim, 1997b. 9 Figures available from the UK Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2006. Attention in this paper is on presidents' lifetime citations. These are normalized for discipline into a P-score, or scholarly score, and used as a proxy measure of each individual leader's past research productivity. (Descriptive data on the sample of presidents are available in Appendix B).
Dependent Variable: University Performance
There are several ways to measure the long-term performance of a university.
One of the most common, although possibly the least scientific, is to use the league tables which have become ubiquitous. The main problem with rankings is their lack of consistency in assessment methodologies. Most league tables are media-generated, produced by commercial organizations designed to make money by selling their publications. To create a story, the methodology is changed, often annually, which ensures that institutions at the top rotate (Lombardi et al., 2002) .
The UK has had a system for appraising research universities since 1986, one that takes place every few years. Selectivity is on the basis of quality in that institutions that conduct the best research receive a larger proportion of the available grant. Based on peer review, the Research Assessment Exercise provides quality ratings for research across all disciplines. Panels use a standard scale to award a rating for each submission. Scores are assigned to units of assessment (equivalent to academic departments broadly speaking) depending on how much of the work is judged to reach national or international levels of excellence 10 .
The Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) is the measure of university performance used in this study. It was felt to be appropriate because of the emphasis it places on the output of academic research, which is a core function of research universities, the other being teaching. Although teaching is a central activity of universities, it could be argued that it is research quality that top universities prioritize. This seems clear from the fact that promotion within the faculty is typically through a peer-review process that focuses almost entirely on candidates' research productivity. There is some evidence in the UK that an academic department's teaching quality is linked to its research quality 11 . Rosovsky, 1991) suggest that faculty who are motivated by research, remain interested in their subject and may, therefore, teach with more passion. 12 These are 5A*, 5B* and 5A. In RAE 1992 the three top scores were 5A, 5B and 5C. The 2008 RAE has once again adopted a different method of assessment. 13 Regression equations have been done for improvement in RAE awards right across the grade-5 spectrum, and a similar pattern is found. The tables showing these results --in all submissions awarded a grade 5 A-E --are not included in this paper, but can be found in Goodall, 2009. movement, up or down, in the number of excellent departments in his or her institution. It also controls for institutional revenue, age and the scholarly discipline of presidents.
Measure of Performance
Independent Variable: Presidents' Lifetime Citations
Citations are references to authors in other academic papers as acknowledgement of their contribution to a specific research area. They are used in this paper to measure the research success of each president. Bibliometric information is generally viewed as a reliable indicator of research performance over time (van Raan, 2003) and it compares fairly with peer review (Nederhof and van Raan, 1993) ; also, RAE results have been shown to correlate highly with bibliometric data (Oppenheim, 1995 , 1997a , Bence and Oppenheim, 2004 14 .
Most academics who go into administrative jobs reduce their research output.
This depends, somewhat, on their discipline. The data generated for the purposes of this study make it clear that university presidents accumulate the overwhelming majority (approximately 95%) of their citations before they become institutional leaders.
For this paper the lifetime citations of British university presidents are normalized for discipline 15 .
Most important when using citations as any kind of measure is recognition of the huge differences between disciplines. For example, a highly cited social scientist might have a lifetime citation total of around 1200 whereas a molecular biologist could have a score over 12,000. Bibliometric indicators have been used more consistently across the sciences than in the humanities and social sciences (van Raan, 1998) . These disciplines publish more journal articles and have a higher prevalence of co-authorship.
Why Use Citations Instead of Journal Articles?
There is a growing body of work that uses citations to assess intellectual output and productivity (see, King, 2004 and Bayers, 2005) . Moreover, citation counts are a good predictor of professorial salaries (Hamermesh et. al., 1982) and Nobel Prizes (Garfield and Welljams-Dorof, 1992 ). An alternative approach is to count an author's published articles and weight by journal impact-factors. However, this presents three problems. First, monographs would be excluded from the data.
Second, the quality of a journal is a noisy measure of the future impact of individual articles (Oswald, 2007) . For example, many highly cited articles are not published in 'Grade A' journals and similarly vice versa. Finally, assigning weight to journal quality through, for example, ISI Impact Factors might not be reliable --even if they were available --for papers published 10-20 years ago. Furthermore, impact factors still rely on citations as a way to rank journals.
Normalizing Citations to P-scores
In this paper, each university president is assigned a normalized citation score, which reflects both the differences across disciplines and their personal citation levels.
This score is referred to as the 'P-score' = president's individual lifetime citation score normalized for discipline. The P-score has been generated by developing a scale that is then used as an exchange rate, normalizing the different citation conventions across disciplines. A description of the normalization process is presented in Appendix C.
The presidents in this study span a number of years, and therefore those who are older have, in principle, had longer to accrue citations. Hence, for example, if the presidents with low numbers of citations can be shown to be significantly younger than those with high life-time scores, age could be influential. However, inspection of the age profile of all leaders in my dataset finds that there are no age differences between those with the highest and lowest citation scores 16 .
Control Variables: Organizational Revenue, Age and Discipline of President
Three control variables have been included in the regression analyses:
organizational income, the president's age, and the academic discipline of each president. Allowing for lags, university revenue has been included for years 1992/3 and 1996/7 17 (figures supplied by the Higher Education Statistics Agency in the UK).
The income figures include government funded grants, tuition fees and education grants and contracts, research grants and contracts, endowment and investment income, miscellaneous income and income from services rendered.
The age variable has been included by calculating the age of an incumbent president in 1992 and 1996. The academic discipline of a president is defined by creating two fields, the 'sciences' that are coded 0, and the 'social sciences and humanities' coded 1.
Results
What the Leaders Say about Performance in the Research Assessment Exercise
Before looking at the statistical evidence, it is interesting to hear from UK vice British vice chancellors (VCs) expressed little doubt about the necessity for leaders to be centrally involved in the RAE.
-"The vice chancellor is the only one in the university who can influence the RAE. A VC must set the quality standards and keep reinforcing them -pushing the quality line up."
Vice chancellors explained the processes through which a university leader can influence RAE performance. 
Statistical Results
Here Causality can be more easily tested longitudinally; the action, it might be reasoned, must precede the outcome.
Before presenting the statistical findings, three questions need to be addressed:
First, how easy or hard is it to reveal shifts in the performance of a university? The answer is that trying to explain change, or difference, is demanding. Patterns are more easily found in cross-sectional data. Measurement error is intrinsically more of a problem in change equations. This is particularly problematic for social scientists with small sample sizes. Alternatively, a university with 1 top department that moves to 2 departments has improved its performance by 100%. Later I perform a test for this potential distortion, and I find that institutions that improve the most are not doing so merely because they had the furthest scope to change.
Cross-Sectional Analysis with Lags
The descriptive data are given in Initial results can be found in the simple cross-sectional bar diagram in Figure   2 . The focus here is on the presidents of those universities that made the greatest gains, and the smallest gains, in the number of submissions graded excellent between RAE 1992 and 2001. The presidents' citations --on the Y axis --represent the means in P-score between 1992 and 1996. By design, this allows for a lag.
As can be seen in Figure 2 , the universities that advanced the most during this period --increasing their number of excellent-rated departments --were disproportionately led by presidents with higher lifetime citations. The mean citation P-score of leaders running the UK's top five mover-universities at the start is 13.6 and the mean P-score of those heading the top ten mover-universities is 9.6. However, of the universities that accumulated the least number of improved scores across the nine year period --indeed some actually reduced their number --the citation P-score of leaders for both the lowest 5 and 10 universities is 3.1. Therefore, presidents leading the top twenty per-cent of mover-institutions are three times more highly cited, and those leading the top ten per-cent of mover-institutions have over four times the lifetime citations of those who led the universities that performed least well. Tables 2 -7 report the regression equations. These attempt to establish more carefully whether a statistically significant relationship exists between organizational performance, the dependent variable, and president's P-score, among other independent variables. In the following tables the effect of the independent variables is measured by the coefficients, and the level of significance is given by the t-statistic.
Results are presented for three time periods. The first is 1992 to 1996, followed by 1996 to 2001, and finally the full 9 years, 1992 to 2001. Given the likely importance of lags, the last of these, incorporating two research exercises that span just under a decade, would seem to be the most robust. Table 2 gives simple equations where the dependent variable is the level, or number, of excellent departments, or top-fives, in 1996 in the RAE, and reports the effects of the independent variables in 1992.
As can be seen, the P-score of a president in 1992 is statistically significantly related to the number of top-five departments later on in 1996. The coefficient is 0.30 (t-statistic = 2.29) which is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Table 2 also shows that organizational income is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient is 0.10 (t-statistic = 6.27). But age and discipline of president are not here statistically significant 19 . Table 3 gives instead results for the number of top-five departments in the 2001 RAE and reports the effects of the independent variables in 1996, again allowing for a lag of five years. In 2001 data the P-score coefficient is 0.53 (t-statistic = 3.04) which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Again, the finance variable correlates with organizational performance. The coefficient is 0.09 (t-statistic = 7.28).
However, there is no statistically significant relationship with either age of leader or their academic discipline. The size of the coefficient on P-score is somewhat mediated by adding the extra variables (comparing column 1 to column 4 in Table 3 ). Table 4 again presents cross-sectional evidence but now with a longer lag.
Results are given for the number of top-five departments in the 2001 RAE and the effects on that of the independent variables in 1992. This time I allow for a lag of nine years. Here a leader's P-score, the key independent variable, has been averaged between years 1990-94. By averaging P-score over four years I hope to reduce some measurement error insofar as the results are less likely to be driven by one year of observation. Table 4 reports that P-score is statistically significant --at the 1% level --after all independent variables have been included. Again the finance variable correlates with university performance.
In terms of the size of the effect of P-score, the first column in Table 4 illustrates that one extra point on a president's P-score (averaged 1990-1994) Although lags are used, the results so far are fundamentally cross-sectional.
Now we turn to longitudinal analysis where the dependent variable is the change, up or down, in performance. Table 5 gives regression equations in which the dependent variable is the change in the number of top-five, or excellent, departments, in the Research Assessment Exercise between 1992 and 1996. As can be seen in all columns in Table   5 , the association between P-score in 1992 and the later performance in 1996 is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient is approximately 0.13 (tstatistic = 3.43). University income does not now, in columns 2-4 of Table 5 , have a significant effect on the changes over time in the number of top-five departments. It is likely that money is more significant in equations correlating P-score with the number of top 5 departments, because income is a proxy for the size of an institution.
Longitudinal Analysis
A large university will tend to have more departments. When focusing on the change however, income or size appears less important.
Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 5 show that, again, there is no well-determined effect from the age of a president or the academic discipline to which they belong. Table 6 shows a slightly different pattern. In 2001 the number of top-fives is statistically unaffected by presidents' P-scores five years earlier in 1996. However, although the coefficients on P-score across the four columns are not significantly different from zero, they remain positive. Again, there is no significant effect from income or from the age or discipline of a leader.
A statistically significant relationship between performance and leaders' lifetime citations is reinstated again in Table 7 when a longer time perspective is adopted. As suggested earlier, this 9-year interval may be a more realistic reflection of the length of time needed to improve RAE performance. Presidents' P-scores have again been averaged between years 1990-94 as with the previous nine year equation.
As can be seen in Table 7 , P-scores are correlated with growth in the number of excellent departments obtained nine years later in the 2001 RAE. The coefficient in the first column of Table 7 is 0.24 (t-statistic 3.27) and statistical significance is established at the 1% level. Noticeably, the coefficient is double that of the 1992-1996 result reported in the earlier Table 5 . Finance, age and discipline are not correlated with university performance. In columns 2-4 of Table 7 , their inclusion in the regression equation leaves the coefficient on P-score approximately unaffected.
The results presented in Tables 2 through 7 show that a president's lifetime citations score, or past success as a scholar, is significantly correlated with the future number of top grades that a university attains in the RAE. Conversely, university revenue does not affect growth performance. A measure that follows the growth in departments rated excellent may be a particularly appropriate gauge of RAE performance, because excellence must be reached across all faculty in a given unit of assessment.
The results presented in this paper illustrate the relevance of presidents' Pscores when explaining universities' performance in the UK Research Assessment
Exercise. In other words, there is evidence consistent with a statistical, and perhaps causal, relationship between the past level of scholarship attained by a president and the future performance of their university.
Checking for Distortions and for Reverse Causality
As mentioned above, these kinds of regression equations may 'favor' The strongest case for a causal interpretation of my data is perhaps Table 7 .
The nature of the leader in the early 1990s helps predict how that institution will have changed by 2001.
Measuring Change on Change
A full fixed-effects test to examine the impact of leaders on the performance of universities would be to regress the change in performance on the change in leader.
In my study I show, in a number of ways, that those universities that were consistently led by better scholars went on to perform better in attaining the highest scores in the UK Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). The paper cannot completely show that a 21 Granger and Newbold, 1974. change in leadership produces a change in performance, because to present such evidence would require an extension beyond the nine years lag included in the data.
Early bibliometric data on university leaders are not currently available in ISI Web of Knowledge, the source used in this study. Eventually this problem should be solvable when further data become available 22 .
Part Two --Qualitative Evidence
Why Scholar-Leaders Might Improve the Performance of Research Universities
The quantitative evidence above suggests that hiring scholar-leaders into research universities can result in improved research performance. In this section I will draw upon interview material with US presidents and UK vice chancellors to try to bring us closer to potential explanations about why scholar-leaders might improve the performance of their universities 23 .
It is interesting to hear from leaders themselves and to conjecture why it might be beneficial for universities to select presidents with strong research records. The full qualitative material exceeds the space available; therefore, only a representative sample of interviewees' statements appears (for list of interviewees, see Figure 1 ). .
Four explanations emerge from interviews with the twenty-six heads --that
better scholars appear more credible as leaders, that they have expert knowledge of the core business of universities, that they are standard bearers, and finally, that leaders who are scholars signal organizational priorities. Each will be dealt with separately.
Credible Leadership
"You have to know the game; if not you lack credibility. Being a distinguished researcher gives you legitimacy in either a business school or a university.
And legitimacy gives you authority as a leader." 24
That leaders must be credible to followers was the most common assertion made by those I interviewed. It was suggested that, in the context of a university, an accomplished scholar communicates his or her credibility, and specifically, that he or she shares the same value system and priorities as those who are being led. As suggested by one leader, credibility legitimizes authority. This approach focuses on the social interactions between leaders and their followers 25 .
In the words of one US dean:
-"You need to engage the hearts and minds of faculty. Being a researcher means you have equal status, offer faculty support, speak the same language, have academic resonance and credibility, and finally, trust; trust is very important to have as a leader."
Credibility can perhaps be defined as an external factor in that it must be assigned by others. It is noticeable that all those who emphasized credibility and intellectual values were leaders with traditional academic backgrounds. None of the non-academic leaders presented these kinds of arguments. The noted educationalist Birnbaum 26 claims that presidential candidates with a traditional academic career path confer the greatest legitimacy. This is particularly true for those being selected into the most prestigious institutions.
One US university president put the same argument in terms of gaining faculty respect:
-"The rationale for ranking academic excellence very highly is the enormous importance we place on the president having the respect of the faculty. Without that, it is very difficult to lead a research university."
A president being credible and also having empathy for the life of scholars was viewed as important by a majority of interviewees. Five statements are presented below; the first is from a US president. This factor, expert knowledge, is internal or behavioral. As suggested earlier, I propose that, in the context of a knowledge-intensive organization like a university, having been an expert or top scholar provides one with a deep understanding of the organization's core business, which may in turn helpfully influence the behavior of leaders. It could be argued that this inherent expertise and learning shapes the way she or he sees the world and, therefore, affect a leader's decision-making preferences and priorities 28 . It is also possible that having expert knowledge allows presidents who were better scholars to develop superior strategies for their organization since they may be able to understand universities in ways that others cannot.
One UK vice chancellor refers specifically to his internal knowledge and And by a UK vice chancellor:
-"I have to inspire and motivate people, and to set targets --to create a supportive environment and crucially to appoint the best people."
It is interesting to hear from UK heads about how they directly engaged with the Research Assessment Exercise, the performance measure used in the statistical analyses in Part One:
-"My own research was 5* quality and I was an expert in my field. It is very important to be a good researcher and to look others in the eye when they say they can't do something or are moaning about having to raise research funding."
These arguments suggest that having expert knowledge of the core business not only influences leader-behavior towards the prioritizing of research and the selection of faculty, but that it may also instill the confidence to assess quality.
However, it is not a zero-sum game --the false idea that more expert knowledge necessarily equals less managerial ability.
The Standard Bearer
"Leaders are the final arbiters of quality. Therefore it is right to expect the standard bearer to first bear the standard."
31
A common theme among interviewees was the importance of the leader in establishing a quality threshold. The setting of an organization's academic standards was viewed as a significant part of the function of president or dean. However, as a number of interviewees suggested, if you have not originally met that standard yourself, this may be difficult to enforce. Some presidents and vice chancellors also argued that it is easier to put pressure on others to perform to a high level if you, as leader, are an accomplished scholar.
One former UK vice chancellor stated:
-"How can you exhort others if you haven't done it yourself?"
A similar statement was made by another head:
-"My job is to lead, to represent the university internally and externally and set the quality threshold. By quality-threshold I mean articulate and decide upon what level of quality the university wants to aspire to. When a quality-threshold is established, it
sends out a message that no one below the threshold should be accepted into the university; it sets the quality agenda."
A US president again states that in order to set the standard you must first meet them:
-"My job involves broad direction-setting and imposing standards. In order to impose standards it is easier if you have first met them yourself."
A UK vice chancellor focuses on the institution's research ambitions:
31 US dean. Thus, if the head of an institution can have this effect, it makes good sense for the leader of a research university to have been a respected scholar. Also, by continuing to do research, a head enforces a second kind of standard, namely, a demonstration to faculty that despite an enormous workload they can still publish.
Probably it is easier for social scientists or those in the humanities to continue with their academic work. Scientists who need labs and grant money may not have this option. This is suggested by the comment of a respected chemist who took up a leadership position:
-"Once a scientist gets 'off the train' it is irreversible."
Of the twenty-six leaders interviewed, most of whom were from traditional academic backgrounds, many are still publishing.
Signaling Effect
"Being a researcher sends a signal to the faculty that you, the president, share their scholarly values and general understanding.
It also sends an internal signal to colleagues that research success in the institution is important."
32
Selecting a noted scholar to lead a university may send out a message to internal and also external stakeholders. A university governing body might wish to use the appointment to signal a change in institutional strategy, or, alternatively, to signal that there will be more of the same. This point is made above by a US president interviewed for this study, and also by Shirley Tilghman, President of Alumni may also approve of having famous scholars at the helm.
Distinguished people tend to have their work profiled more regularly in the media.
Arguably, individuals get positive feelings from hearing or reading about scholars from one's Alma Mater. Alumni also like to know that the brand value of their former university is being retained or improved.
Conclusion
This study examines whether university performance is linked to leadership. The paper's hypothesis is tested using multiple regression analysis, with university performance in the UK's Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) as the dependent variable, and presidents' scholarly achievement as the key independent variable. The focus is on changes in university performance over a nine-year period.
Control variables for university income, presidential age and discipline are used.
Although the data-set is inevitably a fairly small one --it covers a panel of 55 universities and 157 university presidents --the inquiry is to my knowledge the first of its kind. 36 . Also, it should not be assumed that all outstanding researchers will inevitably go on to make good managers or leaders.
They will not. The central argument in this paper is that where expert knowledge is the key factor that characterizes an organization, it is expert knowledge that should also be key in the selection of its leader. The paper's findings have policy implications for universities, R&D units, and other research and knowledge-intensive organizations. The evidence suggests that there is a direct pay-off from having leaders who are technical experts in their field. *One president has exceptionally high citations (Anthony Giddens). When I exclude this observation, the P-score mean is 4.38, standard deviation is 6.92. The highly cited president does not influence the paper's results. The key correlations are not affected by this outlier because the calculations in the paper allow for lags. Hence, only presidents' P-scores in 1992 and 1996 are used. The mean P-score of presidents in 1992 is 5.15 and the mean P-score of presidents in 1996 is 4.62. Presidents who were humanities 5 10 10
Presidents who were non-academics *One president has exceptionally high citations (Anthony Giddens). When we exclude this observation the P-score mean is 5.06. Omitting this president from the analysis leaves the paper's conclusions unaffected.
APPENDIX C.
Citation Normalization Process
The discrepancies in citation levels across disciplines are demonstrated in the number of new cited references that appear in ISI every week (see over). The sciences generate approximately 350,000 new cited references weekly, the social sciences 50,000, and the humanities 15,000 37 . Although the presidents have different disciplinary backgrounds, that require normalization, they are from a single country, which presumably improves validity when using citations data as a comparative measure. Language biases have been shown to exist within ISI (van Leeuwen et al., 2001 ) but this should not be a problem with a UK cohort.
The P-score produced through a normalization process makes it possible to do likefor-like comparisons between individuals from different disciplines (Goodall, 2006) .
To obtain a P-score, the individual presidential citations were hand-counted, totalled, and then divided by the ISI Highly Cited disciplinary thresholds shown above. The thresholds are dominated by science subjects, totalling 19. The social sciences are also covered, but there are only two social science subject areas, namely 'Economics and Business' and 'Social Sciences -General'. Currently, no 'Highly Cited' category exists for authors in the arts or humanities.
The humanities score was created by the author using the previously mentioned 'new cited references' generated by ISI each week. If we divide the social science weekly score of 50,000 by the humanities score of 15,000 we get a figure of 3.33. The author then divided the 'Social Sciences, General' score of 117 by 3.33 which creates a score of 35.13. The number 35 has been used here as the 'Humanities, General' score. Using citation thresholds produced by ISI HiCi, a normalized citation score has been produced in this paper for 23 subject areas.
An effort has been made to try to assign accurately citation numbers to people's names. Though some measurement error must be presumed, two studies that adopt different counting methods -- Seng and Willett (1995) who use a very precise method on the one hand, and Oppenheim (1995) who assigned citations more approximately on the other --report similar correlations. 
APPENDIX D.
Qualitative Methodology
The qualitative data consist of 26 interviews with leaders --both university heads and deans --in universities in the US and UK (see Figure 1) . The second level clustered interview material around the key themes that emerged from the data. In all interviews between the author and university leaders, there was an agreement that no names would be attributed to statements in any materials or publications (unless, in a few cases, approval from participants had first been sought).
Therefore, in this paper, no names are assigned to interview statements. Only information on their position --for example, 'former president' or 'dean' --accompanies the statements.
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